关键词: 关键词： 公司治理；国有企业；监督机制；制约机制；董事会；监事会

Abstract:

Abstract： The present supervision system of the stateshared enterprise is not able to prevent the threat of corruption from the stateowned enterprise. Just take an enterprise as example. A contrast of related laws, and an analysis of the shortcoming of the supervision system of the stateshared enterprise, can discover that it is the absence of supervision function in management regulation that causes such problems as corruption and property erode. While the existing design of supervision system does not agree with the feature of publiclyowned economy as well as the demand of supervision work, the constructing mode and the power deployment of the management organization result in the personal arbitrary decision of the stateowned enterprise. In detail, there are following shortcomings: (1) Since the proprietor and its representative do not produce a good system of restricting agents, the group company acts as the controlling shareholder in the form of the agent of government, being both the controlling company and the enterprise. And noncontrolling shareholders, including foreign shareholders and private shareholders, are difficult to take effect. (2) The system of the director board is so short of conditionality that the director and the manager are actually combined into one. Hence, decisionmaking mechanism and work division form the organizational foundation of personal arbitrary action. The selection of the independent director is not independent, and the constitution of the salary committee doesn' t stand alone. (3) The existing organizational structure results in the absence of the leader supervision function of censor board and inspecting commission. On the one hand, the supervisor has such a low rank and power that he accomplishes nothing; and on the other hand, the leading body of supervision and the functional supervision department of internal enterprise confuse mutually. What' s more, internal control system is not strict, and employee supervision organization is only an empty shell. (4) The existing supervision subject of management structure is characteristic of parochialism. In the management structure of enterprises, there are not such positions as ultimate proprietors, original agents and initial clients. To a large extent, the supervision position of the enterprise party organization is empty. For the stateowned enterprise, the trustiest supervision subject is the public or the employee as the proprietor. To realize the effective supervision of stateowned economy, it is necessary to depend on multiple stateowned property, balanced organizational structure and democratic management supervision.