关键词: 县级人大代表, 政治资本, 私营企业家, 利益整合,  

Abstract:

 Given China's current political and economic system, the crucial resources needed for the development of private enterprises are in the hand of local governments. Meanwhile, private enterprises share common interests with local administrators. Private entrepreneurs have taken the advantage of the loopholes of China’s People's Congress system by operating multiple forms of connections to be elected as deputies to county people’s congresses so as to seek political capital in favor of enterprise development. These private entrepreneurs have divorced from the representation of voters. Their proposals and suggestions are not in their real interests and their performance of deputies in and out of sessions is a mere formality. They seek profits by establishing unofficial relationships with local administrators, instead of institutionalizing their interests in the light of county people’s congresses. As a result, the depth and stability of political participation is restricted for private entrepreneurs, especially for small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, who have to seek temporary and specific interests by influencing administrators in power, for one thing. For another, due to lack of open arenas for interests competition, private entrepreneurs’ interests appeals are short of regulated interactions with other social strata, thus not conducive to social and political stability.

Key words: deputies to county people’s congresses, interests integration, private entrepreneurs, political capital