上海大学学报(社会科学版)

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对近期有关实践存在论批评的反批评——对董学文等先生的批评的初步总结

  

  1. 复旦大学中文系
  • 收稿日期:2010-06-23 出版日期:2011-01-15 发布日期:2011-01-15

A CounterCriticism of the Recent Criticism about Practical Ontology
——An Initial Summary of the Criticism by Mr. Dong Xuewen and Others

  • Received:2010-06-23 Online:2011-01-15 Published:2011-01-15

摘要:

摘要: 将“实践存在论”理解为马克思的实践观与海德格尔的存在论的拼凑的观点源自对“存在论”(ontology)理解的片面和对马克思主义思想体系的完整性的割裂。在马克思那里,“物质”、“自然界”仅是“本原”意义上的“第一性”,而非“本体”。从《1844年经济学—哲学手稿》到后期的政治经济学批判,马克思对于“存在”(on、being、Sein)问题的追问是一以贯之的。马克思对包括旧唯物主义在内的一切古典哲学和形而上学的真正革命性超越在于他同“实践观”紧密结合的存在论思想,而非所谓的“物质本体论”。

关键词: 关键词: 实践存在论;实践;存在论;马克思主义

Abstract:

(Department of Chinese Language and Literature, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China)Abstract: The argument about "practical ontology" as being the patchwork of Marx' s view of practice and Heidegger'  ontology derives from a onesided understanding of "ontology" and a separation of the integrity of Marxist ideology. In view of Marx, "matter" and "nature" are merely "primary" in the sense of "origin" rather than "ontology." From the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 to his later critiques of political economy, Marx constantly inquiries into the question of "existence" (on, being, sein). His true revolutionary transcendence, beyond all classical philosophies and metaphysics including old materialism, is his ontological thinking closely combined with the "view of practice," rather than the socalled "substantial ontology."
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