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上海大学学报(社会科学版)

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可置信承诺与诚信政府建设

周国雄   

  1. 上海理工大学管理学院，上海 200093
  • 收稿日期:2007-04-01 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2007-07-15 发布日期:2007-07-15

Believable Promise and Honest Government Construction

ZHOU Guo-xiong   

  1. Shanghai University of Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China
  • Received:2007-04-01 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2007-07-15 Published:2007-07-15

被引次数

3

摘要： 政策执行是将公共政策从理念状态转化为现实状态的关键环节，也是有关各方进行利益表达和策略互动的动态过程。其中，作为政府组织为促进政策执行做出的奖励与惩处“承诺”对于政策执行结果具有直接影响。从政策执行博弈的可置信承诺概念入手，可以发现探讨加强政府诚信建设与提高公共政策执行力之间的内在逻辑联系，从而可为政府诚信建设提供若干参考价值。

关键词: 政策执行, 重复博弈, 可置信承诺, 诚信政府

Abstract: Policy execution, as a key link in change from the principle of public policy to its practice, is a dynamic process of benefit express and tactics interchange between two relative sides, among which, the governmental “promise” of reward or punishing that has been kept for promoting policy execution gives a direct influence on the result of policy execution. This essay, starting from the concept of believable promise in policy execution game, gives a probe into the inherent relation between strengthening honest government construction and enhancing public policy execution and makes some suggestion on honest government construction.

Key words: repetitive game, believable promise, honest government, policy execution

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