Currently, China’s data legislation inherits the“problem-oriented”paradigm of traditional sectoral law, which fails to align with the rapidly evolving technological characteristics of the digital domain. Consequently, it suffers from limitations such as the coexistence of regulatory conflict and homogeneity, inadequate responsiveness to practical bottlenecks, and a lack of foresight. To tackle these challenges, the theory of interest balancing should be introduced. By observing the interaction and bargaining processes among various stakeholders in data lawmaking, and thereby“returning to the legislative scene,”this approach can facilitate a paradigm shift in data legislation. The legislative methodology of interest balancing offers threefold advantages: first, the“hierarchical structure”of interests can effectively cope with the composite nature of data rights; second, the“social consensus”attribute of interests helps mitigate legislative gaps; third, the stability of interests helps defuse legislative lag. Specifically, data legislation based on interest balancing should take the resolution of interest conflicts as its baseline, place its focus on balancing heterogeneous interests, and aim to adapt to technological developments. It should identify the interest balancing patterns potentially involved in data legislation through interest classification, and design differentiated legislative paths tailored to the distinct priorities of balancing homogeneous and heterogeneous interests.

interest balancing, data legislation, legislative methodology, homogenized benefits, heterogeneous benefits