Abstract:

Big data and other information technologies have propelled the rapid rise of data-driven platforms, spurring innovation within the platform economy. However, they have also led to the predatory acquisition of data-driven platforms. Theoretical analysis indicates that data-driven platforms have created anti-competitive effects such as disrupting market competition structures, stifling innovation, and harming consumer welfare through predatory acquisitions. A case-based analysis of classic domestic and international examples of anti-monopoly regulation reveals that the primary challenges in regulating these predatory acquisitions include unreasonable declaration standards, difficulties in defining relevant markets, and inadequate assessments of competitive damage. Therefore, to address the anti-monopoly regulation problems associated with predatory acquisitions of data-driven platforms and to promote the fair and orderly development of the platform economy, China can optimize the declaration standards for platform predatory acquisitions, refine methods of defining relevant markets, and strengthen the assessment of competitive damage from platform predatory acquisitions, thereby comprehensively establishing an anti-monopoly regulatory system for predatory acquisitions by data-driven platforms.

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